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Home is where the Heart is: Determining ―Habitual 
Residence‖ under the Hague Convention on the  
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
Stephen I. Winter  
INTRODUCTION 
We live in an interconnected world. People move, if not freely, 
then often with relative ease across international borders. Families, 
businesses, and national economies are often global in scope. One 
nation‘s economic crisis can bankrupt nations an ocean away.1 The 
challenges created by widespread migration often require focused 
international efforts.
2
 One such challenge, international parental child 
abduction, posed a mounting problem for the world community in the 
latter part of the twentieth century.
3
 In 1980, faced with this 
burdensome problem and lacking a uniform method of resolving the 
resulting legal disputes, twenty-three nations
4
 assembled in The 
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 1. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Palin’s Kind of Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, 
at A31 (―[T]he government of Iceland just seized the country‘s second-largest bank and today is 
begging Russia for a $5 billion loan to stave off ‗national bankruptcy.‘. . . [F]inancial 
globalization has gone so much farther and faster than regulatory institutions could govern it. 
Our crisis could bankrupt Iceland! Who knew?‖).  
 2. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 12 (5th 
ed. 2009). Professor Legomsky cites United Nations figures showing that nearly three percent 
of the world‘s population, approximately 175,000,000 people, migrated from their country of 
birth between 1990 and 2000. Id.; Trends in Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision, United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, http://un.org/esa/population/ 
publications/migstock/2003TrendsMigstock.pdf. 
 3. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(3) (2008). 
 4. This number does not include countries that participated in the proceedings but did not 
vote to adopt the Convention. Voting countries included ―Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
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Hague to create the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (―Convention‖).5 
The United States Department of State alone receives hundreds of 
requests for assistance in recovering children removed from the 
United States.
6
 At times, the circumstances surrounding the civil 
abduction of children can be shockingly dramatic.
7
 For those 
 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, 
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.‖ Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention, Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session (1980), 3 Child 
Abduction 426 n.1 (1982), http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter ―Perez-Vera 
Report‖]. Additionally, Egypt, Israel, and Italy took part in the proceedings but did not vote. Id. 
―Morocco, the Holy See, and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics sent observers.‖ Id. 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction recognizes the 
Perez-Vera Report ―as the official history and commentary on the Convention and [as] a source 
of background on the meaning of the provisions of the Convention available to all States 
becoming parties to it.‖ Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1996). Additionally, ―many circuits hold 
Professor Elisa Perez-Vera‘s report to be an authoritative source for interpreting the 
Convention‘s provisions.‖ Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 As of October 24, 2008, eighty-one countries had either ratified or were in the process of 
being accepted as members to the Convention. Status Table, Hague Conference for Private 
International Law, Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24.  
 5. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1501–1505 (1980) 
[hereinafter ―Convention‖]. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act implements the 
Convention within the United States. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610 (2008). 
 6. See Department of State‘s Letter of Submittal to the President, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
99-11 (1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter ―Letter of 
Submittal‖]. The Letter of Submittal notes that during the years leading up to the United States‘ 
ratification of the Convention ―about half of the several hundred requests to the Department of 
State for assistance in recovering children taken out of the United States have involved 
abductions to countries which participated in the preparation and negotiation of the Hague 
Convention.‖ Id. 
 7. For instance, in Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006), a physically abusive 
father removed his children from Germany without the mother‘s knowledge, and the mother 
was unable to determine the location of her children for several months. Id. at 708; see 
discussion infra Part I.A.2. In Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2007), a 
family moved to Greece due to the attacks on September 11, 2001, but the mother returned with 
her children after discovering that her husband brought his mistress to Greece and refused to 
send her away. Id. at 620; see discussion infra Part I.A.1. In Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 
1396 (6th Cir. 1993) (―Friedrich I‖), a heated argument resulted in a wife and son being kicked 
out of their apartment in Germany by the father. Id. at 1399; see discussion infra Part I.A.3. The 
American mother returned the next morning with multiple American soldiers to remove her 
possessions. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1399. 
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privileged enough to live free of such stresses, the narratives of these 
cases often feel as if they are works of fiction. However, whether 
compelling or mundane, these events are always tragic, and their 
circumstances are all too real for the individuals affected. Parents 
certainly suffer, but often the children at the heart of these 
controversies are most direly affected.
8
 The upheaval and family 
strain that results from the removal of a child from his or her home 
can represent a threat to that child‘s current and future well-being.9 
A. Purpose of the Convention 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction establishes procedures that provide for the prompt return 
of children wrongfully retained or removed from their habitual 
residence.
10
 One of the Convention‘s primary purposes is to ―protect 
children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful 
removal or retention‖11 by promptly restoring the child‘s ―pre-
abduction status quo.‖12 This acts to deter parents from moving 
 
 One particular case has received attention from the national media in recent months. The 
Brazilian wife of a New Jersey man, David Goldman, abducted their young son to Brazil. The 
Today Show, Dateline, and Fox News, among other news programs, have featured Mr. 
Goldman‘s story. Bring Sean Home Foundation: The Campaign for the Return of 
Internationally Abducted Children, http://www.bringseanhome.org/home.html (last visited July 
10, 2010).  
 8. The Perez-Vera Report states: 
[I]n the literature devoted to a study of this problem, ―the presumption generally stated 
is that the true victim of the ‗childnapping‘ is the child himself, who suffers from the 
sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has 
been in charge of his upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the 
necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown 
teachers and relatives.‖  
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 431–32. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.  
 11. Convention, supra note 5, at pmbl.; see also Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 431 
(―[T]he struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must always be 
inspired by the desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their 
true interests.‖). The Perez-Vera Report goes on to state that ―children must no longer be 
regarded as parents‘ property, but must be recognized as individuals with their own rights and 
needs.‖ Id. 
 12. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996) (―Friedrich II‖). The 
Convention, however, does not provide for the determination of custody. See Convention, supra 
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across international borders in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage 
through jurisdiction in a more sympathetic court.
13
 The Convention 
thus ―reflects a worldwide concern about the harmful effects on 
children of parental kidnapping.‖14 Wrongful removal or retention 
―deprives the child of the stable relationships which the Convention 
is designed promptly to restore‖15 and negatively affects the child by 
taking the child ―out of the family and social environment in which 
its life has developed.‖16 
B. The Essential (and Elusive) Concept of “Habitual Residence”  
Analysis under the Convention begins with a determination of the 
child‘s state of habitual residence.17 The child‘s country of habitual 
residence provides the domestic law applicable to whether a child‘s 
removal breached custody or access rights.
18
 Only if in breach of 
 
note 5, art. 19; Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (―The Convention‘s 
focus is thus whether a child should be returned to a country for custody proceedings and not 
what the outcome of the proceedings should be.‖). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B); Holder, 392 F.3d at 1014 (stating that ―the Convention is 
intended to prevent . . . [parents from using] ‗force to establish artificial jurisdictional links 
. . .‘‖); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993) (―Friedrich I‖); Letter of 
Submittal, supra note 6, at 10,497 (―If the Convention machinery succeeds in rapidly restoring 
children to their pre-abduction or pre-retention circumstances, it will have the desirable effect 
of deterring parental kidnapping, as the legal and other incentives for wrongful removal or 
retention will have been eliminated.‖); see also Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 428–29. 
 14. President‘s Letter of Transmittal to the Senate, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-11 (1985), 
reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,495 (Mar. 26, 1986). The Secretary of State‘s Letter of 
Submittal specifically states that the Convention‘s ―overriding objective was to spare children 
the detrimental emotional effects associated with transnational parental kidnapping.‖ Letter of 
Submittal, supra note 6, at 10,496.  
 15. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10,494, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
 16. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 428. 
 17. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001) (―‗Habitual residence‘ is the 
central—often outcome-determinative—concept on which the entire system is founded.‖); 
Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1403 (―[T]he Hague Convention is clearly designed to insure that the 
custody struggle must be carried out, in the first instance, under the laws of the country of 
habitual residence.‖).  
 18. Article 3 of the Convention provides: 
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where— 
a it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other 
body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/12
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these rights will the taking be considered ―wrongful,‖ bring the 
removal or retention within the Convention‘s scope, and require the 
child‘s prompt return.19  
The Convention does not define ―habitual residence.‖20 Instead, 
the Convention deliberately left ―habitual residence‖ undefined in 
order to ―leave the notion free from technical rules which can 
produce rigidity and inconsistencies as between different legal 
systems.‖21 In doing so, the Convention sought to prevent habitual 
residence from acquiring an overly technical or idiosyncratic 
definition comparable to the notion of ―domicile.‖22 Additionally, 
 
b at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly 
or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
The right of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a above, may arise in particular by 
operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of 
an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State. 
Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. 
 19. Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1, 3, 4; see also Linda Silberman, Interpreting the 
Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1049, 1063–64 (2005); cf. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 (6th Cir. 2007) (―When faced 
with a petition for return of a child under the Hague Convention, the courts of signatory nations 
may only determine the merits of the abduction claim; the merits of the underlying custody 
claim are not to be considered.‖). 
 20. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1400. In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit noted that since the term‘s 
first use in the 1954 Convention Relating to Civil Procedure, and despite its appearance 
―throughout the various Hague Conventions, none of them defines it.‖ Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1071. 
The Perez-Vera Report refers to ―habitual residence‖ as ―a well-established concept in the 
Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from 
domicile.‖ Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 445.  
 21. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1071 (citing J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 144 (10th ed. 1980)). 
 22. See Robert, 507 F.3d at 989; Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 
2006) (―‗Habitual residence‘ sounds like ‗domicile,‘ which in law refers to the place that a 
person considers to be his permanent home. . . . But it is not domicile.‖); Gitter v. Gitter, 396 
F.3d 124, 133 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the widespread view that ―habitual residence differs 
from domicile‖); Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council, (1983) 2 A.C. 309 (U.K.); see 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11–23 (1986). Additionally, see 
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004), where the court quoted the unpublished 
but influential British case of In Re Bates. The court stated: 
the notion [of habitual residence is] free from technical rules, which can produce 
rigidity and inconsistencies as between legal systems. . . . The facts and circumstances 
of each case should continue to be assessed without resort to presumptions or 
presuppositions. . . . All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does 
has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.  
Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1252 (alteration in original).  
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when enacting the Convention through the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act (―ICARA‖),23 Congress recognized ―the 
need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention.‖24 
The Convention requires uniformity if is to effectively achieve its 
stated goals of, among other objectives, the deterrence of forum-
shopping and the protection of a child‘s well-being.25  
Unfortunately, courts both domestically and internationally have 
interpreted ―habitual residence‖ differently, and thus have failed to 
offer the world community an articulate and unified definition.
26
 
Some courts instruct that ―habitual residence‖ should simply be 
interpreted ―according to the ‗ordinary and natural meaning of the 
two words it contains[, as] a question of fact to be decided by 
reference to all the circumstances of any particular case.‘‖27 Others, 
especially the American courts, have attempted to apply a variety of 
rubrics or ―presuppositions and presumptions‖ when assessing 
habitual residence, with varying degrees of influence and success.
28
 
C. My Proposal  
A determination of habitual residence must focus on the child‘s 
acclimation and settled purpose. Consideration of parental intent is a 
 
 23. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610 (2008). 
 24. § 11601(b)(3)(B). See Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1071. 
 25. In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit expanded on these goals, stating: 
The Convention seeks to protect children by creating a system of rules that will inform 
certain decisions made by their parents. ―Habitual residence‖ is the central—often 
outcome-determinative—concept on which the entire system is founded. Without 
intelligibility and consistency in its application, parents are deprived of crucial 
information they need to make decisions, and children are more likely to suffer the 
harms the Convention seeks to prevent.  
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1072; Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1400 (―Since the strict definition of ‗wrongful 
removal‘ is based on the concept of ‗habitual residence,‘ an ad hoc determination of the latter 
amounts to an ad hoc determination of the former.‖); see also supra text accompanying note 13. 
 26. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 27. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1071 (citing C v. S, (1990) 2 A.C. 562 (U.K.)); cf. id. at 1073 n.13 
(―‗[T]here is no real distinction between ordinary residence . . and habitual residence.‘‖).  
 28. See, e.g., Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1067 (focusing primarily on parental intent); Feder v. 
Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) (balancing parental intent with the child‘s 
acclimation); Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1396 (focusing on the factual circumstances surrounding 
the child‘s past experience). 
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necessary part of this inquiry. Additionally, an emphasis on objective 
factual indications of where a child considers his or her home to be 
adds consistency and concreteness to an otherwise subjective 
standard. 
D. Outline of the Note’s Structure 
Part I.A first outlines the three major divisions in habitual 
residence interpretation within the United States, paying particular 
attention to the approaches of the Ninth, Sixth, and Third Circuits. 
Next, Part I.B briefly addresses international trends in habitual 
residence interpretation among other signatory nations. After 
analyzing the shortcomings of each approach in Part II, Part III 
emphasizes a renewed emphasis on the child in all habitual residence 
determinations.  
I. HISTORY 
A. Trends among Courts in the United States 
American courts tend to align themselves into three major camps 
when determining a child‘s habitual residence. One approach, 
represented by the influential Ninth Circuit decision in Mozes v. 
Mozes,
29
 focuses primarily on settled parental intent while taking into 
account the child‘s acclimation to his or her environment.30 Another 
approach, prominently represented by the Third Circuit‘s decision in 
Feder v. Evans-Feder,
31
 determines habitual residence by attempting 
to balance parental intent with the child‘s acclimation to his or her 
environment.
32
 A third approach, typified by the Sixth Circuit‘s 
decision in Friedrich v. Friedrich,
33
 focuses attention solely on the 
factual circumstances surrounding the child‘s past experiences.34 
 
 29. 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 30. Id. at 1073–79. 
 31. 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 32. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224. 
 33. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d 1396. The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed Friedrich I in 
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 34. Friedrich I, 983 F.3d at 1401. 
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1. Focusing on Parental Intent 
In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit outlined a standard by which courts 
could determine habitual residence that was significantly different 
from the majority of prior Convention interpretations.
35
 In 1997, an 
Israeli woman and her children moved from Israel to Los Angeles.
36
 
Her husband, the children‘s father, consented to a temporary move of 
eighteen months.
37
 After one year in the United States, the wife 
sought a divorce and the father filed a petition under the Convention 
for the return of his children to Israel.
38
  
The Ninth Circuit elucidated an analytical framework it hoped 
would make the determination of habitual residence more 
consistent.
39
 Noting the limitations of an approach based solely on 
subjective intent or factual circumstances,
40
 the court proposed a new 
 
 35. Mozes was both a new way to approach a habitual residence determination and a case 
of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 36. Id. By 2001, the children ranged in age from seven to sixteen. Id. 
 37. Id. The move occurred because ―both parents agreed that the children would profit 
from a chance to attend school [in the United States], learn English and partake of American 
culture.‖ Id. 
 38. Id. The father only sought the return of his three youngest children, aged nine, five, 
and five. Id. The oldest child had voluntarily returned to Israel. Id. 
 39. See id. at 1071–74. 
 40. The court first stated that, while the most straightforward method of determining 
habitual residence would be to look at a person‘s behavior, this approach is flawed. Id. at 1073–
74. Depending on the time frame examined, an observer could come to widely varying 
conclusions about a person‘s habitual residence. The court used, as an example, a person 
observing a child‘s behavior over the course of several summer months. If that child spent the 
summer at an overnight camp, then the observer would unreasonably conclude that the camp 
was the child‘s habitual residence. Id. at 1074. Instead, the court agreed with an English 
approach that examines a person‘s subjective intent, termed a person‘s ―settled purpose‖: 
The purpose may be one or there may be several. It may be specific or general. All the 
law requires is that there is [sic] a settled purpose. That is not to say that the propositus 
intends to stay where he is indefinitely; indeed his purpose, while settled, may be for a 
limited period. Education, business or profession, employment, health, family or 
merely love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular 
abode. . . . All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a 
sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.  
Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council, (1983) 2 A.C. 309 (U.K.). 
 However, the court reasoned that while habitual residence logically encompasses a sense of 
being ―settled,‖ a court looking for this concept alone would not be able to distinguish between 
―borderline‖ cases where there might be settled intent, but not to make that place one‘s habitual 
residence. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1074. 
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rubric. The court stated that a person can only have a single habitual 
residence,
41
 therefore the ―first step toward acquiring a new habitual 
residence is forming a settled intention to abandon the one left 
behind.‖42 Although the Convention focuses on the child, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that children often are not psychologically capable 
of choosing their residence.
43
 Therefore, courts should instead look to 
parental intent.
44
 However, the court also noted that it must take into 
account factual circumstances because Convention cases often 
involve parents who do not agree on their child‘s residence.45 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that the parents‘ settled intent 
alone is not sufficient to alter a child‘s habitual residence.46 Enough 
time must pass to allow the child to acclimate to his or her new 
geographic location.
47
  
 
 41. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075 n.17 (―This is consistent with the view held by many courts 
that a person can only have one habitual residence at a time under the Convention.‖) (citing 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993) (―Friedrich I‖), Freier v. Feier, 969 
F. Supp. 436, 440 (E.D. Mich. 1996)). 
 42. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075. The court later clarified that this inquiry focused on whether 
the parent had a settled intent to abandon. Id. at 1076–78. A parent could demonstrate this intent 
through his or her words or deeds, and either intentionally or unintentionally. Id. 
 It is unclear why the court used this language, instead of asking the more proper question 
under the Convention of whether the United States remained the children’s habitual residence. 
Complete abandonment of a residence is similar to the technical and inappropriate concept of 
domicile. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 43. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076 (―Children, particularly the ones whose return may be 
ordered under the Convention, normally lack the material and psychological wherewithal to 
decide where they will reside.‖); cf. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993). 
For further discussion, see infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 44. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076. Specifically, the intention ―of the person or persons entitled 
to fix the place of the child‘s residence.‖ Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 45. The court proceeded to place these factual circumstances into three general categories. 
The first category includes circumstances where the family unit had ―a settled purpose to 
change habitual residence‖ even though one parent ―may have had qualms about the move.‖ Id. 
at 1076. Under such circumstances, courts tend not to let one parent‘s reservations prevent 
finding a ―shared and settled purpose. Id. at 1077. The second category encompasses situations 
where the child‘s move was only meant to be for a specific period, but one parent changes their 
mind and intends to remain. Id. Here, courts tend not to find that the changed intentions of one 
parent alter a child‘s habitual residence. Id. A third category includes situations where the 
petitioning parent previously consented to an indeterminate stay abroad. Id. If the court can 
infer that the child was meant to stay indefinitely, then the court will find an abandonment of 
the former habitual residence. Id. However, if there is no settled intent to abandon, then courts 
will examine the factual circumstances. Id. at 1077–78. 
 46. Id. at 1078. 
 47. Id. 
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However, while a child‘s acclimation might overcome a lack of 
settled parental intent, ―courts should be slow to infer‖ that a child‘s 
acclimation to his surroundings has in fact resulted in the 
abandonment of that child‘s prior habitual residence.48 The court 
reasoned that the Convention seeks to protect the stability of the 
child‘s environment49 and prevent child abduction by reducing the 
incentives that accompany abduction.
50
 The easier it is to shift 
habitual residence, ―then the greater the incentive to try.‖51 The 
ultimate question courts must ask is not whether a child has become 
settled, but ―whether the United States had supplanted [the prior 
country] as the locus of the children‘s family and social 
development.‖52  
The Ninth Circuit revisited and elaborated on its habitual 
residence analysis in Holder v. Holder.
53
 In Holder, a military family 
with two young children
54
 moved from the United States to Germany 
when the father was assigned to a four-year assignment.
55
 Eight 
months after arriving in Germany, the mother traveled to the United 
States with the children and did not return.
56
 The father petitioned 
under the Convention for the children‘s return to Germany. In 
determining the children‘s habitual residence, the Ninth Circuit first 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. The court stated: 
Since the Convention seeks to prevent harms thought to flow from wrenching or 
keeping a child from its familiar surroundings, it is tempting to regard any sign of a 
child‘s familiarity with the new country as lessening the need for return and making a 
finding of altered habitual residence desirable. Further, some courts regard the 
question whether a child is doing well in school, has friends, and so on, as more 
straightforward and objective than asking whether the parents share a ―settled intent.‖  
Id. at 1078–79. 
 50. See, e.g., Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079 (It ―could open children to harmful manipulation 
when one parent seeks to foster residential attachments during what was intended to be a 
temporary visit. . . .‖). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1084. 
 53. 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 54. The elder child ―had barely finished kindergarten at the time [the father] commenced 
this petition. . . .‖ Id. at 1017. 
 55. Id. at 1012. 
 56. Id. The parents disagreed on whether they intended the trip to the United States to be a 
six-week vacation or an indefinite stay. Id. 
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restated the standard it presented in Mozes.
57
 The court held that the 
parents never formed a settled intent to abandon the United States as 
the children‘s habitual residence, placing great weight on the 
―specific, delimited period‖ that the family planned to spend in 
Germany.
58
 The court discounted objective indications of residence 
that other circuits consider determinative.
59
 Additionally, the court 
elaborated on the issue of acclimatization.
60
 If the child‘s life is 
―firmly rooted in [her] new surroundings,‖ then that child is 
acclimated to her new home.
61
 However, the court noted that children 
 
 57. Id. at 1015. Specifically, the court said that there must be a settled intent to leave 
one‘s prior habitual residence combined with a change in geography and the passage of time 
sufficient to allow acclimation. Id. The court emphasized the fact-specific nature of the 
determination and clarified that focusing on the parents‘ settled intent was solely a surrogate for 
the settled intent of children considered developmentally incapable of determining their own 
residence. Id. at 1016–17 (describing children‘s habitual residence as the ―fundamental inquiry‖ 
under the Convention). The court further noted ―[t]hat children will not indefinitely bend to 
their parents‘ wishes,‖ a concept specifically recognized by the Convention‘s proper application 
only to children under sixteen. Id. at 1017; see Convention, supra note 5, art. 4; Perez-Vera 
Report, supra note 4, at 450. 
 58. Although the court admitted it was a ―close case,‖ nearly four years had passed. This 
is a substantial amount of time in the life of a young child. See Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 
1009, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004). Compare Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) (children 
habitually resident in United States after approximately one year), and Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 
703, 717 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that three years spent in Germany, together with various other 
objective facts, is sufficient to conclude that a move was of a ―settled nature‖), and Shalit v. 
Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1128 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (―[t]hree years is certainly enough time . . . to 
be considered ‗settled‘‖), with Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2007), and 
Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
 59. These objective indications of residence include shipping or selling one‘s possessions. 
Holder, 392 F.3d at 1018. The court felt that these facts deserved less weight because the 
military had offered to transport all of the Holder‘s belongings. Id. The court also noted that 
being ―settled‖ does not mean that location is where you plan to ―leave your bones.‖ Id. 
(quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1077). 
 In a later case, the Ninth Circuit placed greater emphasis on the objective facts that might 
establish habitual residence. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 626. The Ninth Circuit‘s decision in 
Papakosmas is discussed infra Part I.A.I and notes 71 and 72.  
 60. A court must examine the child‘s acclimation when conducting a Holder or Mozes 
type analysis because ―it is possible for a child‘s contacts standing alone to be sufficient for a 
change in habitual residence,‖ although courts should do so only reluctantly. See Holder, 392 
F.3d at 1019. The Holder court recognized that an ―acclimatization‖ analysis could encompass 
―intangible factors‖ that further an inquiry into where the child‘s family and social environment 
were located. Id.  
 61. Id. (―The inquiry is . . . whether the children‘s lives have become firmly rooted in their 
new surroundings. Simply put, would returning the children to Germany be tantamount to 
sending them home?‖) (footnote omitted). However, the court emphasized that 
―acclimatization‖ is not ―acculturation‖ and should not be measured through superficial cultural 
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can take part in daily life while understanding that ―one has another 
life to go back to,‖ and that therefore the children‘s eight months in 
Germany did not overcome the lack of parental intent to abandon the 
United States.
62
  
The Ninth Circuit recently applied its habitual residence 
framework in Papakosmas v. Papakosmas.
63
 In Papakosmas, a 
couple from the United States with two children decided to leave the 
United States for Greece.
64
 The couple sold their businesses, house, 
furniture, and the family dog before moving.
65
 A few months after 
their arrival, the mother discovered that her husband‘s mistress had 
accompanied the family to their new home.
66
 The husband refused to 
send his mistress away, and the mother could not leave because her 
husband controlled the family‘s passports.67 Eventually, the mother 
acquired the means to return to the United States with the children, 
and the father petitioned for their return.
68
 The court first held that the 
 
comparisons. Id. The court used, as an example, a preference for gummibaeren over Hershey 
bars. Id. 
 62. Holder, 392 F.3d at 1020. Finding that different reasoning was necessary when 
considering a kindergartener‘s circumstances as compared to an infant‘s, the court examined 
each child‘s circumstances in turn. Id. at 1019. The court noted that the elder son had begun to 
transition to life in Germany because he attended school, played organized sports, and 
experienced life outside the base. Id. The younger son‘s situation forced the court to tackle how 
to determine the habitual residence of an infant. The court reasoned that an infant is usually 
habitually resident in his or her parent‘s habitual residence. Id. The court noted, however, that 
―[t]he place of birth is not automatically the child‘s habitual residence‖ and thus if born in a 
country in which the parents are not habitually resident, the child could be without a habitual 
residence entirely. Id. (citing PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 112 (1999), as suggesting that ―a child 
may be without a habitual residence because ‗if an attachment [to a State] does not exist, it 
should hardly be invented.‘‖). The court concluded that the youngest child was habitually 
resident in the United States. Furthermore, the court concluded that it was not possible for a 
newborn child to acclimatize outside the parent‘s home environment. Holder, 392 F.3d 1020–
21. For further discussion of young children‘s habitual residence, see infra note 117. 
 63. 483 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 64. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, negatively affected the family‘s hotel 
business and led to their move. Id. at 620.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Several dramatic events occurred before the mother acquired the means to return to 
the United States, including several trips to the United States Embassy and a family dispute that 
resulted in the father allegedly stabbing or otherwise injuring his wife with a knife. Id. at 620–
21. The wound was not fatal, and the district court determined that it was likely self-inflicted. 
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parents did not have a settled intent to abandon their prior 
residence.
69
 Instead, the objective facts indicated that the mother had 
only a conditional intent to move to Greece.
70
 These facts included a 
lack of a going away party and the contents of cards given to the 
eldest child from his classmates, but what the court found most 
important was the parents‘ intent to continue doing business in the 
United States.
71
 Second, the court asked whether the facts showed 
that the children‘s habitual residence changed despite the parent‘s 
lack of shared intent. In determining that it had not, the court noted 
that the family had never had a permanent home while in Greece and 
were only there for four months.
72
  
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit‘s approach to 
habitual residence determinations in Ruiz v. Tenorio.
73
 In Ruiz, a 
couple and their two children moved to Mexico.
74
 Nearly three years 
later, the mother removed the children from Mexico and brought 
them to the United States.
75
 While in Mexico, the father took a job, 
the family began construction on an ―American-style‖ home, the 
children attended school, and they forged friendships.
76
 The couple 
 
Id. Eventually, the United States Embassy provided the mother and children with the means to 
return to the United States. Id. 
 69. Id. at 624.  
 70. Id. at 623–24. The court cited Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2004) 
and Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005) to support its finding of conditional intent, and 
distinguished Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) as containing stronger 
objective indications of a shared intent to abandon. Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 
625 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 71. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 624. The court found the cards given by the child‘s 
classmates to be ―ambiguous at best and, in many cases, supportive of Yvette‘s contention that 
the move was temporary.‖ Id. The court did not clarify why it felt that what the child‘s 
classmates thought about the child‘s move to Greece was important to a determination of the 
child‘s habitual residence and acclimation. 
 72. Id. at 626–27. Further evidence included the children‘s attendance at English-speaking 
schools, the older son threw tantrums, and the mother took a trip back to the United States after 
only two months. Id. 
 73. 392 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 74. The father intended the move to be permanent, although he told his mother-in-law that 
the move was only temporary. Id. at 1249.  
 75. Id. at 1249–50. The children were approximately five and eleven years old at the time 
of their removal from Mexico. Id.  
 76. Id. at 1249–50, 1255. However, although the mother and children held only tourist 
visas, the parents did not attempt to obtain Mexican citizenship or permanent legal status for 
them. The parents, however, did not attempt to change the children‘s official citizenship. Id. at 
1255. The mother traveled with her children to the United States twice to visit her sister in 
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eventually separated, but the mother and children remained in 
Mexico for nearly six months before their removal.
77
 While it was a 
―close case,‖ the court concluded that the children‘s habitual 
residence never changed to Mexico.
78
 The court‘s analysis followed 
the rubric set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes. First, the court held 
that the parents had not formed a settled intent to abandon the United 
States as the children‘s habitual residence.79 Next, the court held that 
the children had not sufficiently acclimated to Mexico to overcome 
their parents‘ lack of shared intent.80 
Another ―close case‖ within the Eleventh Circuit forced the court 
to confront complications that arise from the deportation of one 
parent. In Mikovic v. Mikovic,
81
 the United States deported a non-
resident after he overstayed his visa.
82
 He left behind his American 
wife and child.
83
 Despite some marital trouble, his wife sold the 
couple‘s home and belongings in order to move to Wales and live as 
a family.
84
 She applied for and received residency status in Wales, 
enrolled the couple‘s child in day care, signed a lease on a family 
home, applied for government health services, and received free 
medical treatment through the state program.
85
 One year later, the 
 
Florida. While in Florida, she opened a bank account (purportedly because she intended to 
return) and obtained a Florida nursing license. Id. at 1250. The second trip resulted in her initial 
refusal to return with the children to Mexico, although the father convinced her to return to 
Mexico and give the marriage another chance. Id. 
 77. Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1250. 
 78. Id. at 1256. 
 79. While acknowledging that the mother and father‘s intent was ambiguous, the court 
emphasized that the father told his mother-in-law that they might return to the United States, the 
mother retained American bank accounts, had her mail forwarded to an American address, and 
transferred her nursing license within the United States. Id. at 1254. 
 80. Id. at 1253–55. The court did note, however, that there were relevant objective facts 
that might otherwise show acclimation. Id. at 1255. Impliedly, the court might therefore have 
found differently had there been either shared parental intent to abandon the United States as 
the children‘s habitual residence or if the court did not need to consider shared parental intent at 
all. 
 81. 541 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (M.D. Fl. 2007). 
 82. Once deported, the father was unable to return to the United States for at least ten 
years. Id. at 1266.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1266–68. Before the move to Wales, Mrs. Mikovic twice joined her husband in 
his native Slovakia for short periods. Id. On the second trip, she held a job for approximately 
five months, acquired permanent residency in Slovakia, and became pregnant. Id. She returned 
to the United States to have the child. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1268–69. Furthermore, she engaged in preliminary discussions about purchasing 
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wife secretly took their child and returned to the United States.
86
 The 
court analyzed the child‘s habitual residence in light of the couple‘s 
larger history, and found that the parents did not have a settled intent 
to alter the child‘s habitual residence.87 The court found the mother 
only intended the move to be contingent on the improvement of the 
couple‘s marriage.88 As such, it held that the objective factors that 
demonstrated the child‘s acclimation to the United Kingdom during 
the ―significant‖ stay in the country were insufficient to place the 
child‘s habitual residence in Wales as opposed to the United States.89 
2. Balancing Parental Intent and Child Acclimation  
In Feder v. Evans-Feder,
90
 the Third Circuit held that a 
determination of habitual residence must focus on the child when 
examining the child‘s acclimation to his or her environment, the 
child‘s degree of ―settled purpose,‖ and the parents‘ present shared 
intentions regarding their child‘s location.91 In Feder, an American 
couple with a three-year-old child moved to Sidney, Australia, after 
the husband accepted a position with a bank.
92
 While apprehensive 
 
a home in Wales and attempted to obtain a Welsh passport. Id. at 1268–71. Her acceptance by 
the National Health Service is particularly intriguing in light of the court‘s eventual holding that 
the child‘s habitual residence was not Wales. Id. at 1283. One is eligible for the free medical 
services provided by the British government only if one is ―deemed to be an ‗ordinary resident‘ 
of the UK.‖ Id. at 1283 n.16. An ―ordinary resident‖ is an individual who is ―‗living in the UK 
voluntarily for a settled purpose as part of the regular order of his or her life for the time being‘ 
with ‗an identifiable purpose for his or her residence here‘‖ if ―that purpose [has] a sufficient 
degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.‖ Id. This standard is strikingly similar 
to the required degree of settled purpose necessary for a finding of habitual residence, which the 
court earlier found to require abandonment of one‘s prior residence and ―a sufficient degree of 
continuity to be properly described as settled.‖ Id. at 1278 (quoting Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 
1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004)).  
 86. Id. at 1271. 
 87. Id. at 1278. This ―macro‖ view contrasts with what the court termed a ―micro‖ view of 
the case, where it would determine habitual residence based on the parties‘ activities from when 
the mother and child first moved to Wales until they returned to the United States a year later. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 1280. 
 89. Id. at 1280–81. 
 90. 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 91. Id. at 224. The court based this holding largely upon the reasoning set forth in 
Friedrich and British Convention jurisprudence. Id.; Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
 92. Feder, 63 F.3d at 218. Before moving, the couple thoroughly researched the move and 
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about the move, Mrs. Feder agreed to it in order to keep the family 
intact and work at her marriage.
93
 The family put their home and 
various household items up for sale, purchased a house in Australia, 
and began to renovate it.
94
 In Australia, the child attended nursery 
school and Mrs. Feder enrolled him in kindergarten.
95
 Additionally, 
Mrs. Feder accepted a role with the Australian Opera Company and 
committed to a performance the following year.
96
 After six months, 
Mrs. Feder traveled with her son to Pennsylvania under the auspices 
of visiting her parents, but actually intended to remain permanently in 
the United States.
97
 Mr. Feder promptly filed in Australia under the 
Convention.
98
  
The Third Circuit held that the boy was habitually resident in 
Australia.
99
 The court focused on the child and reasoned that ―a 
child‘s habitual residence is . . . where he or she has been physically 
present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and 
which has a ‗degree of settled purpose‘ from the child‘s 
perspective.‖100 Therefore, any analysis must be based on the ―child‘s 
circumstances . . . and the parents‘ present, shared intentions 
regarding their child‘s presence there.‖101 The court determined that 
the child not only spent ―a significant period of time [in Australia] for 
a four-year-old,‖ but that his parents had intended him to remain in 
Australia for the foreseeable future.
102
 Moreover, he had participated 
in some of the ―most central activities in a child‘s life‖ while in 
 
its implications. They traveled to Australia, stayed in Sidney, spoke with American expatriates, 
a relocation consultant, and real estate agents, as well as consulted an accountant. Id. 
Additionally, the couple inquired with the Australia Opera regarding employment for Mrs. 
Feder. Id.  
 93. Id. at 219. 
 94. Id. Mrs. Feder personally oversaw the renovations. Id. The family also obtained 
Australian Medicare cards. Id. Mr. Feder filled out paperwork in order to obtain permanent 
residence for his family, but Mrs. Feder chose not to sign the necessary papers. Id. 
 95. Id. at 219. Mrs. Feder also applied for the boy‘s admittance to a private school once he 
reached the fifth grade, even though that would not occur for seven years. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 219–20. Upon her arrival in the United States, she filed for divorce and refused 
to return the child to Australia. Id. at 220.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 224. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
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Australia for those six months.
103
 Instead of focusing on the mother‘s 
contingent intent, the court emphasized the parents‘ shared 
intentions.
104
 
The Third Circuit recently took an opportunity to refine and 
clarify its analysis of habitual residence in Karkkainen v. 
Kovalchuk.
105
 In Karkkainen, an eleven-year-old girl‘s parents 
allowed her to choose whether she wanted to live in the United States 
with her father or Finland with her mother.
106
 With her mother‘s 
approval, she became a legal permanent resident of the United States 
and expressed her desire to live there permanently.
107
 While in the 
United States, she took classes and strengthened her relationship with 
both her stepmother and stepmother‘s family.108 Her mother had 
second thoughts about allowing her daughter to remain in the United 
States indefinitely and filed a petition under the Convention for her 
return.
109
 While the Third Circuit admitted that it was a ―close call,‖ 
the court held that the girl was habitually resident in the United 
States.
110
 The court reasoned that the record reflected the girl‘s 
 
 103. These activities included attendance at preschool and enrollment in kindergarten. Id. 
 104. The contingent condition was if her marriage ended at an indefinite future date; 
however, the court held that this does not void ―the couple‘s settled purpose to live as a family 
in the place where Mr. Feder had found work.‖ Id.  
 The dissenting opinion by Judge Sarokin offers an interesting view on the proper standard 
of review regarding habitual residence determinations. He argues, in part, that by reviewing the 
finding of habitual residence as a mixed question of fact and law, an appellate court‘s decision 
may result in the detrimental ―tugging and shuttling‖ of the child between geographic locations 
(and thus parents) during what are often lengthy court proceedings. Id. at 231 (Sarokin, J., 
dissenting). For instance, in Feder the court of appeals reversed the district court, and as a 
consequence the boy would need to return to Australia for further proceedings. Id. However, by 
the final appellate decision the boy had been with his mother in the United States for nearly a 
year. Instead, due to the ―immediate effect upon the residency of the child involved,‖ Judge 
Sarokin felt the court should review all findings of habitual residence solely for clear error. Id. 
at 227–29. 
 105. 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 106. Id. at 285–86.  
 107. Id. at 285. While she became a legal permanent resident, she initially only visited her 
father and stepmother in the United States for brief periods. Id. at 285–86. Her parents‘ actions 
led her to believe that she would be able to remain in the United States. They helped her plan a 
trip to the United States over the summer, enrolled her in a private American school, and 
allowed her to leave Finland for the United States after she informed her mother that she would 
not return. Id. at 286. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 286–87. 
 110. Id. at 297–98. 
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acclimatization to the United States and her abandonment of 
Finland.
111
 Moreover, her parents‘ initial shared intent to allow her to 
live in the United States facilitated the girl‘s rapid acclimation.112  
In making its decision, the court elaborated on its approach to a 
habitual residence determination. The court first ―considers whether a 
child has made a country her home before the date of her removal or 
retention.‖113 This acclimatization and settled purpose inquiry takes 
into account the child‘s ―experience in and contacts with her 
surroundings,‖ as well as whether the child has become ―firmly 
rooted‖ so that a return would take the child from her ―family and 
social environment.‖114 The court listed several specific factors from 
Convention case law ―indicative of acclimatization and a degree of 
settled purpose from the child‘s perspective,‖ including ―school 
attendance‖ and ―social engagements.‖115 Shared parental intent is 
considered because the Convention attempts to prevent the unilateral 
alteration of the child‘s ―status quo.‖ Therefore, failing to consider 
shared parental intent could potentially cause the court to overlook 
whether a parent is acting unilaterally to alter what had been 
previously agreed to by both parents.
116
 Additionally, the court noted 
that shared parental intent is important because it can alter how 
quickly a child is capable of acclimating.
117
  
 
 111. As evidence of her acclimation, the court pointed to the girl‘s enrollment in school 
and participation in classes, her travel within the United States, her development of familial 
relationships, and the high maturity and intelligence that accelerated her acclimation. Id. at 294. 
Specific evidence of her abandonment of Finland included that she brought many of her 
belongings with her, she informed her friends and teachers that she would not return to Finland, 
and she communicated her decision to remain in the United States to her parents and 
stepparents over the summer. Id. The court acknowledged that there were factors present that 
weighed against a finding of acclimatization. Namely, the court questioned whether sufficient 
time elapsed for the girl to acclimate to the United States. Id. However, the agreement between 
her parents allowing her to remain in the United States if she chose was ultimately held to have 
allowed her to acclimate much more quickly than otherwise possible. Id. at 294–95. 
 112. Id. at 292; see also infra note 117. 
 113. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292. 
 114. Id. at 291–92. 
 115. Id.; 445 F.3d at 293 (citing Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995), 
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004), and Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 
1013 (9th Cir. 2004)). The full list included ―academic activities,‖ ―school attendance, social 
engagements, and attendance,‖ as well as participation in athletics and trips within the new 
country. Id.; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 569 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2009).  
 116. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292. 
 117. See id. at 294 (―[T]he intentions of a child‘s parents ‗affect[] the length of time 
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Several other circuits have emphasized an inquiry into the child‘s 
acclimation while also considering parental intent. In Koch v. 
Koch,
118
 the court adopted the standard set forth in Mozes while 
focusing its holding on the objective facts surrounding the child‘s 
acclimation.
119
 While the district court found the Mozes framework 
inconsistent with the Convention‘s intent and the jurisprudence of 
other signatory countries,
120
 the Court of Appeals adopted Mozes‘s 
reasoning and held that the parents had abandoned their children‘s 
habitual residence in the United States.
121
 The court reasoned that the 
parents‘ hope to someday return to the United States must be viewed 
 
necessary for a child to become habitually resident, because the child‘s knowledge of these 
intentions is likely to color its attitude to the contacts it is making.‘‖) (citing Mozes v. Mozes, 
239 F.3d 1067, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 In cases where the child is very young, shared parental intent is the primary method by 
which a court can determine habitual residence, because the child is incapable of 
acclimatization by itself. Id. at 296; see also Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 547 (3d Cir. 
2004) (discussing that a child younger than four lacks ―the capacity to form his or her own 
intentions concerning residency‖); Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
infant‘s habitual residence is the same as its mother‘s habitual residence). For further discussion 
of this concept, see Stephen E. Swartz, Note, The Myth of Habitual Residence: Why American 
Courts Should Adopt the Delvoye Standard for Habitual Residence under the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN‘S L.J. 
691 (2004).  
 However, shared parental intent holds less weight when considering the habitual residence 
of an older child. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296–97. 
 118. 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 119. In Koch, a German mother petitioned for the return of her two children to Germany 
after their American father secretly took them to the United States. Id. at 708. The couple 
eventually moved to Wisconsin, where they were married and had two children. Id. at 706. 
After the father‘s business failed, the family moved to Germany with their young children for 
an indeterminate amount of time, but for at least long enough to save some money and allow 
the father to build his resume. Id. One child was only eleven days old at the time the family 
moved; the other was approximately two years old. Id. The family took nearly all of their 
possessions with them. Id. A series of dramatic events culminated in the children‘s abduction 
by their father without their mother‘s knowledge. Id. at 707–08. Effectively disappearing, the 
mother did not know her children‘s whereabouts for nearly four months. Id. at 708. 
 120. Id. at 713. The district court preferred a ―fact-based objective or behavioral approach‖ 
that focused on geography and duration. Id. at 714. It felt that this was in line with the approach 
utilized by other courts internationally, instead of ―Mozes’ assertion that the starting point of the 
habitual residence analysis is whether the parents intended to abandon the previous residence.‖ 
Id. The district court felt that ―[t]he Mozes rule had the unfortunate effect . . . of making 
seemingly easy cases hard, and sometimes leading to questionable results.‖ Id. The court cited 
Ruiz as an example of how courts following the Ninth Circuit‘s approach can place ―undue 
weight on the difficult to ascertain intentions of the parties.‖ Koch v. Koch, 416 F. Supp. 2d 
645, 651 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
 121. Koch, 450 F.3d at 715–19. 
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in light of the family‘s actual actions and larger intentions, all of 
which led to the conclusion that the ―move to Germany was of a 
settled nature.‖122 Moreover, the children‘s habitual residence 
changed to Germany even if the parents had not chosen to abandon 
the United States, because the children had acclimated to Germany.
123
 
In Gitter v. Gitter,
124
 the Second Circuit appeared to base its decision 
upon the Mozes framework, but its ultimate holding may belie what is 
 
 122. Id. at 716–17. Actions that led to the objective conclusion of abandonment included 
that the family left the United States for an indeterminate period with most of their belongings, 
it would be nearly ten years before they accomplished their savings goal, and there was no 
evidence that either parent looked for work in the United States. Id. Additionally, they remained 
in Germany for three years and one child had spent her whole life in Germany, while the other 
had spent three of his five years in Germany. Id.  
 In an unreported case from 2007, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that habitual residence is 
essentially a fact-based determination based on the child‘s acclimation and circumstances. See 
Thompson v. Brown, No. 05C1648, 2007 WL 54100 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007).  
 123. While the court noted that it ―should be slow to infer in the absence of shared parental 
intent that children have changed their habitual residence through acclimatization,‖ the facts 
objectively required the conclusion that ―[r]emoval to the United States . . . was tantamount to 
taking the children out of the family and social environment in which their lives had 
developed.‖ Koch, 450 F.3d at 717. In furtherance of this line of reasoning, the court cited 
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995), for its focus on the child‘s acclimatization 
and settled purpose. Koch, 450 F.3d at 224; see Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 Furthermore, the fact that the husband unilaterally removed the children from their mother 
and faced criminal charges in Germany due to spousal abuse militated against finding the 
United States to be the children‘s habitual residence. Koch, 450 F.3d at 719. For further 
discussion on the interaction between the Convention and victims of spousal abuse, see Dana 
Beth Finkey, Note, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Childhood 
Abduction: Where Are We, and Where Do We Go from Here?, 30 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. 
REV. 505 (2007); Barbara E. Lubin, Note, International Parental Child Abduction: 
Conceptualizing New Remedies through Application of the Hague Convention, 4 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 415, 438 (2005). 
 Soon after the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Koch, the court held in Kijowska that if parents 
never held a shared intention, then the Mozes framework becomes inapplicable to a 
determination of habitual residence. Kijowska, 463 F.3d at 587. Instead, the court must consider 
the child‘s acclimation, the child‘s degree of settled purpose, and (if the child is very young) the 
mother‘s habitual residence. See id. Additionally, the court emphasized that ―habitual 
residence‖ should be interpreted on the basis of the words‘ ―everyday meaning‖ so as to ensure 
uniformity of interpretation and thereby prevent ―forum shopping [from coming] in by the back 
door‖ through selection of a forum that defines ―habitual residence‖ in that party‘s favor. Id. at 
585. Kijowska was a Polish mother who traveled to the United States with her six-month-old 
child in order to visit the child‘s estranged American father. Id. at 586. Immigration officials 
refused to grant the mother entry and forced her to return to Poland without her child after the 
father falsely told an immigration officer that she intended to overstay her tourist visa. Id.  
 124. 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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in actuality reasoning more similar to a ―balancing‖ argument.125 
Consistent with Mozes, it concluded that it is necessary to examine 
parental intentions in order to view the child‘s factual circumstances 
with the proper degree of perspective.
126
 The court determined that 
there was no shared parental intent to alter the child‘s habitual 
residence, as the mother only agreed to move to Israel temporarily.
127
 
Ultimately, though, the court remanded the case for further findings 
related to the child‘s acclimatization to life in Israel.128  
3. Focusing on the Child 
The Sixth Circuit set forth a method of determining habitual 
residence early on in American Convention jurisprudence that 
focused upon the child. In Friedrich v. Friedrich,
129
 a German man 
married an American woman stationed in Germany and they had a 
child.
130
 After a year and a half, a marital dispute resulted in the 
 
 125. In Gitter, an Israeli couple had a child while living in the United States. Id. at 128. 
Mrs. Gitter conditionally agreed to move to Israel. Id. The family closed their American bank 
accounts, sold their cars, gave away their furniture, and enrolled their child in day care in Israel. 
Id. at 125. Unsatisfied with her circumstances in Israel, Mrs. Gitter secretly returned to the 
United States with her child when the boy was approximately two years old. Id. at 129.  
 For further discussion of Gitter, see Carshae DeAnn Davis, Comment, The Gitter 
Standard: Creating a Uniform Definition of Habitual Residence under the Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 7 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 321 (2006). 
 126. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 132 (―[F]ocusing on intentions gives contour to the objective, 
factual circumstances surrounding the child‘s presence in a given location,‖ which allows one 
to determine if a child‘s presence is temporary or permanent.). However, the court noted that a 
court should be slow to find that a child‘s habitual residence changed without the presence of 
shared parental intent. Id. at 133–34. As an example, the court discussed how a child would be 
―habitually resident‖ in a country if that child spent fifteen years there. Id. The usefulness of 
this example is unclear, as the Convention ceases to apply to children older than sixteen—
which the court noted earlier in its opinion. See id. at 132 n.7; Convention, supra note 5, art. 4. 
 127. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135. 
 128. The court reasoned that it lacked enough information to consider the second step of its 
analysis. Id. at 135–36. Additionally, the district court needed to determine if the boy had 
become ―settled‖ within the United States while the proceedings moved through the courts. Id. 
at 136. If he had, then the Convention specifically mandated that the boy would be habitually 
resident in the United States. Id.; Convention, supra note 5, art. 12 (providing that ―even where 
the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year . . . 
[judicial or administrative authorities] shall . . . order the return of the child, unless it is 
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment‖).  
 129. 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 130. Id. at 1398. Mrs. Friedrich was a member of the United States Army. Id. at 1398. 
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mother taking her son to the United States.
131
 The court held that the 
boy was habitually resident in Germany, reasoning that a 
determination of habitual residence ―must focus on the child, not the 
parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.‖132 As 
such, that the boy was born on German soil to a German father, that 
the family lived in Germany, and that the boy‘s ordinary residence 
was Germany were sufficient indicia to conclude that the boy‘s 
habitual residence was also Germany.
133
 The court reinforced its 
focus on the child by stating that Mrs. Friedrich‘s intent to return to 
the United States after she left the military was ―irrelevant.‖134 A 
child‘s habitual residence could only change after a change in 
geography and the passage of time prior to the child‘s removal.135  
 
 131. The couple had a fight, which resulted in the mother and son‘s move to the military 
base. Id. at 1398–99. 
 132. Id. at 1399. The father was unaware of his son‘s removal from Germany until after the 
boy was already in the United States. Id. at 1399.  
 133. The British courts strongly influenced the court in Friedrich, which agreed with 
British decisions that equated habitual residence with ordinary residence. See id. at 1401. 
Moreover, the court discouraged the use of detailed and restrictive rules that would lead the 
term to acquire a technical definition, as ―domicile‖ holds in the common law. Id. at 1401; see 
also supra note 22. 
 134. Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401. The court succinctly summarized its analysis when it 
stated:  
A person can have only one habitual residence. On its face, habitual residence pertains 
to customary residence prior to the removal. The court must look back in time, not 
forward. All of the factors listed by Mrs. Friedrich . . . reflect the intentions of Mrs. 
Friedrich; it is the habitual residence of the child that must be determined. . . . Any 
future plans that Mrs. Friedrich had for Thomas to reside in the United States are 
irrelevant to our inquiry. 
Id. at 1401. 
 135. Id. at 1401–02. The court further stated that changes solely in parental affection or 
responsibility are insufficient, as are ties to another country that simply establish legal 
residence. Id. 
 Ultimately, the court remanded the matter in order to determine the parent‘s custody rights 
before the removal. Id. at 1402; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. Unfortunately 
for all parties, the court did not order the child‘s return to Germany until three years later. 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) (―Friedrich II‖). At that time, the 
court affirmed a district court determination that the father was lawfully exercising his custody 
rights under German law at the time of the removal. Id. at 1067. In doing so, however, the court 
apparently overlooked the fact that the boy had now resided in the United States since August 2, 
1991. Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1399. After four and a half years, the boy was nearly six and had 
spent approximately three quarters of his life on American soil. The order to return the boy to 
Germany therefore may contradict the Convention‘s goal to ―preserve the status quo.‖ Id. at 
1400. 
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In Robert v. Tesson,
136
 and then again in Jenkins v. Jenkins,
 137
 the 
Sixth Circuit strongly reaffirmed its reasoning in Friedrich and 
refined that analysis to reflect a portion of the Third Circuit‘s 
approach to habitual residence. In Robert, an American woman and 
French man married and had twin boys.
138
 The mother and children 
moved back and forth between France and the United States several 
times, staying in each country approximately six months to one year 
at a time.
139
 At about five-and-a-half years old, the boys enrolled in 
an American school, socialized in the United States, and only rarely 
contacted their father.
140
 Before their final move back to France, the 
mother bought round-trip tickets and sent only enough of her kids‘ 
clothes to last two seasons.
141
 After a month in France, the mother left 
with the children and returned to the United States, leaving only a 
note.
142
 The court first reaffirmed its analysis from Friedrich, 
including its emphasis solely on the child‘s experience.143 The Third 
Circuit had refined Friedrich’s standard, and the Sixth Circuit 
adopted its ―settled purpose‖ test.144 However, the court concluded 
that the Third and Ninth Circuits‘ examinations of parental intent 
contradicted the Convention‘s stated intent.145 After focusing on the 
 
 136. 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 137. 569 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the court‘s prior analysis in Robert v. 
Tesson). 
 138. Robert, 507 F.3d at 984. 
 139. The family briefly moved to France for seven months when the boys were about one 
and a half years old. Id. at 984–85. After that, they moved first to Louisiana, then to France 
from 2001 to 2002, where the boys attended French school and became fluent, and then to 
Denver. Id. at 985–86.  
 140. Id. at 984–87. 
 141. She also applied for a French residence card and drivers license, which she later 
claimed was only meant to ensure equality in any potential French divorce proceedings. See id. 
at 986. 
 142. The note claimed, falsely, that the mother and kids were returning to the United States 
to visit to the boy‘s sick grandmother. See id. at 987. 
 143. Id. at 989. 
 144. The Third Circuit held that ―a child‘s habitual residence is the nation where, at the 
time of their removal, the child has been present long enough to allow acclimatization, and 
where this presence has a ‗degree of settled purpose from the child‘s perspective.‘‖ Id. at 993. 
 145. The court discussed how a focus on parental intent inhibits the Convention from 
preventing the child‘s removal from its family and social environment. Id. at 991–92. 
Therefore, it is inconsistent with the Convention‘s goal to deter abduction. Id. While the 
―Hague Convention is intended to ‗secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed,‘ 
the focus on parental intent instead erect[s] . . . barriers to a child‘s return.‖ Id. Furthermore, a 
focus on parental intent instead of the child‘s acclimation and settled purpose subordinates the 
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twins‘ circumstances, the court reasoned that they were habitually 
resident in the United States because they attended an American 
kindergarten and ―formed meaningful relationships with their 
American relatives.‖146 
In Jenkins, an Israeli couple with a young child moved to the 
United States.
147
 The husband had accepted a corporate position that 
required his presence in Ohio for at least three years.
148
 The family 
sold their belongings and residence in Israel, their son began 
preschool in the United States, they purchased a home, and the son 
made friends.
149
 However, by the end of the first year, the wife 
unilaterally returned to Israel, began divorce proceedings, and 
petitioned under the Convention for the return of her son to Israel.
150
 
The court held that the boy was habitually resident in Ohio and 
reasoned that several factors evidenced the boy‘s acclimation to the 
United States.
151
 The boy had developed English language skills 
equivalent to his Hebrew abilities, enjoyed a ―weekly routine‖ in 
Ohio that included community social events, and had all of his 
possessions in his home in Ohio.
152
  
B. International Trends 
No single method of determining habitual residence has emerged 
in international Convention jurisprudence, but there are discernible 
trends. Among English-speaking jurisdictions, the common approach 
is to consider both the child‘s factual circumstances and the settled 
 
child‘s experience rather than honor the Convention‘s desire to recognize children not as 
parental property, but ―as individuals with their own rights and needs.‖ Id. at 991–92; Perez-
Vera Report, supra note 4, at 428–29, 431–32. 
 146. Robert v. Tesson 507 F.3d 981, 995–97 (6th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the court 
concluded that the contrast between the children‘s experience in the United States and their 
dearth of family contact and other ties to France offered dramatic evidence of their habitual 
residence in the United States. Id. at 997. 
 147. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 569 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 148. Id. at 552. 
 149. Id. at 552–53. 
 150. Id. at 553. 
 151. Id. at 556. 
 152. Id. at 556–57. 
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intentions of the child‘s caregivers, with particular weight given to 
the objective facts surrounding the child‘s circumstance.153 
While specific portions of the Ninth Circuit‘s overall method of 
analyzing habitual residence are highly influential in international 
case law, not all of the tenets set forth in Mozes and its progeny have 
been adopted worldwide. Specifically, several international 
jurisdictions have rejected the notion that one must have a settled 
intent to abandon an existing habitual residence before acquiring a 
new habitual residence.
154
 Moreover, only a few jurisdictions place 
significant weight on parental intent.
155
 
 
 153. In re J., an English case, is considered one of the most influential proponents of this 
method. See In re J., (1990) 2 A.C. 562 (U.K.); Koch v. Koch, 416 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648 (E.D. 
Wis. 2006) (summarizing international opinion on habitual residence), aff’d on other grounds, 
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 For additional examples of cases from English-language jurisdictions, see State Cent. Auth. 
v. C.R., [2005] FamCA 1050 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ 
FamCA/2005/1050.html (taking into account objective indications of parental intent and factual 
circumstances of the child); Zenel v. Haddow, (1993) S.L.T. 975, 979 (Scot.) (holding objective 
facts pointing to habitual residence may trump caretaker intent); H.A. v. M.B., [2008] 1 F.L.R. 
289 (U.K.) (holding that child can gain habitual residence in a country despite parental intent to 
the contrary); In re A., [2007] 2 F.L.R. 129 (U.K.) (holding brevity of stay in United States and 
change in mother‘s intent prevented alteration of habitual residence despite previous shared 
parental intent); In re A., [1996] 1 All E.R. 24 (U.K.); Dickson v. Dickson, [1990] S.C.L.R. 692 
(U.K.) (considering the parents‘ intentions but emphasizing the child‘s factual circumstances). 
For an additional international example, see Chan v. Chow, [2001] 199 D.L.R. 478 (Can.).  
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law operates the International Child 
Abduction Database (―INCADAT‖). INCADAT is a free online case database that contains 
English-language summaries of many Convention cases and provides direct links to the full text 
of those decisions. The database is available at www.incadat.com.  
 154. See, e.g., S.K. v. K.P., [2005] 3 N.Z.L.R. 590; In re J., [1990] 2 A.C. 562 (U.K.). 
Including an intent to abandon in a habitual residence analysis results in a concept similar to 
common-law domicile. See sources cited supra note 22. The Convention, however, attempted to 
avoid the technicalities and constrictions inherent in the concept of domicile when it adopted 
habitual residence as its residency requirement. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 155. One example is Israel. See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
International Child Abduction Database, Summary of Ploni v. Almonit (Oct. 27, 2006), 
available at http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=convtext.showFull&code=873&1ng 
=1; see also B.L.W. v. B.W.L., [2007] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 193 (H.K.) (holding that parental intent is 
an essential factor when considering the habitual residence of young children). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Mozes Approach  
Parental intent has a place in a habitual residence determination, 
but the Ninth Circuit‘s inappropriate emphasis on parental intent is 
inconsistent with the Convention and fails to offer uniformity with 
foreign jurisdictions. The Convention seeks to prevent the child‘s 
removal from his or her family and social environment, deter parents 
from unilaterally altering a child‘s habitual residence, and restore the 
child‘s status quo.156 It logically follows that the child, the very focus 
of the Convention‘s attention and intended beneficiary of the 
Convention‘s protections, should also be the focus when determining 
habitual residence. Habitual residence, after all, determines not only 
where that child will live while the ponderous judicial process 
transpires, but also the country whose law will apply to the dispute. 
However, the analysis used by the Ninth Circuit focuses its 
determination of the child‘s habitual residence not on the child, but 
rather on the parents’ subjective settled intent.157 This is problematic 
for several reasons.  
Mozes‘s rationale can result in a child‘s removal from his or her 
family and social environment despite objective indications that the 
child has acclimated to his or her new circumstances. For instance, in 
Ruiz, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the lack of parental settled 
intent when it determined that the children were habitually resident in 
the United States—the nation of their abductor. To make this 
determination, the court downplayed the substantial objective 
evidence of the children‘s acclimation to Mexico, including that the 
children had lived exclusively in Mexico, attended school, and made 
friends for nearly three years.
158
 Several other circuits have noted that 
the Ruiz children‘s removal from their ―home‖159 in Mexico 
 
 156. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 157. Id. at 989–90. 
 158. For the facts of Ruiz, see discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
 159. Perhaps the court in Robert said it best: ―A child who lives in Mexico, attends 
Mexican school, and makes Mexican friends for three years builds an attachment to Mexico that 
would lead any child to call that country ‗home.‘‖ Robert, 507 F.3d at 991. ―The Ruiz/Moses 
rule . . . would return him to the nation of their abductor simply because that abductor held 
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contradicts the Convention‘s intent to prevent a child from being 
―taken out of the family and social environment in which its life has 
developed.‖160 In Mikovic, the court emphasized the mother‘s 
conditional intent to remain in the United Kingdom when 
determining that the couple‘s child was habitually resident in the 
United States. However, the child had spent less than a year in the 
United States before the move, and the mother sold everything when 
leaving the United States, intending by her own admission to create a 
family life for the three of them.
161
 Furthermore, the child‘s father 
was incapable of entering the United States. Removal thus took the 
child from her home life and social environment, and effectively 
prevented any significant father-daughter relationship.
162
  
Rather than deter a parent from unilaterally altering a child‘s 
habitual residence in an attempt to secure a more sympathetic court, 
Mozes‘s rationale allows an abductor to ―lay the foundation for an 
abduction by expressing reservations over an upcoming move.‖163 
 
personal reservations about the original move to Mexico. . . . Such a rule turns the Hague 
Convention on its head.‖ Id. 
 160. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 428–29; see, e.g., id. at 428; Koch v. Koch, 416 F. 
Supp. 2d 645, 651–52 (E.D. Wis. 2006).  
 161. This is in addition to many other important objective facts likely indicating that the 
mother did alter her residence, as discussed supra in notes 81–89 and accompanying text. One 
of the most obvious indications that the mother intended to alter her residence lies in her 
application to Wales‘s National Health Service and her subsequent acceptance of free medical 
care at the British taxpayers‘ expense. See Mikovic v. Mikovic, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1282 
(M.D. Fla. 2007). It is the author‘s opinion that when one moves to another country for any 
length of time, attempts to gain a long-term visa, affirmatively enrolls herself in a national 
social services program, and then takes advantage of that assistance, that individual should 
expect to be forced to utilize that country‘s judicial system. The fact that she signed an 
application whose language nearly parallels the phrasing used by the courts to determine 
habitual residence only strengthens this argument. See supra note 85. 
 162. One might justifiably question the justice in a finding for the abducting parent under 
such circumstances. The father could not follow the mother and child to the United States due 
to a deportation proceeding that barred his reentry for at least ten years. Mikovic, 541 F. Supp. 
2d at 1266. The court‘s holding, then, effectively assured that the child would grow up without 
its biological father. Moreover, it deprived the father of any meaningful future relationship with 
his child, about whom he cared enough to endure the rigors of a Convention proceeding and 
appeal. Furthermore, the mother knew that her husband was an illegal alien when she married 
him, and the child‘s conception occurred after the father‘s deportation. Id. at 1266–67. 
Therefore, the mother not only knew that she ran the risk of being forced to live with her 
husband in another country if he was eventually expelled, but also knew that they would be 
unable to live in the United States as a traditional family. 
 163. Robert, 507 F.3d at 992. See, e.g., Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 2004); Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 
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When the court is unable to determine the parents‘ settled mutual 
intent to abandon their old habitual residence, Mozes ―places a heavy 
thumb on the scale against a finding of a new habitual residence.‖164 
By their nature, Convention cases involve parental disputes over 
prior, present, and future intentions. Since Convention cases rarely 
involve scenarios where the parents shared a settled intent of any sort, 
Mozes directs a court to consider objective circumstances while at the 
same time stating that courts should be hesitant to infer any change in 
a child‘s habitual residence as a result of acclimation. Through this 
rationale, the court sought to prevent the unilateral taking of children 
by making it more difficult to alter a child‘s habitual residence by 
abduction.
165
 However, if a future abductor has effectively ensured 
that there is a lack of settled parental intent to abandon, then the only 
way a court will find a child habitually resident in his or her new 
home is if the abandoned parent can overcome the strong inclination 
against finding that the child has acclimated to his or her new 
environment. Rather than secure the prompt return of a child 
wrongfully removed, this analysis ―erect[s] . . . barriers to the child‘s 
return‖ that impede re-establishment of the child‘s status quo.166  
The Mozes approach propagates a legal fiction that may not 
―require a court to ignore reality‖ completely, but can result in 
reduced emphasis on the most obvious indications of residence.
167
 As 
a result, its practical effect has often ―made seemingly easy cases 
hard and reached results that are questionable at best.‖168 In 
Papakosmas, the court‘s emphasis on determining whether the 
 
617, 626 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 164. Robert, 507 F.3d at 990. 
 165. The court stated: 
The greater the ease with which habitual residence may be shifted without the consent 
of both parents, the greater the incentive to try. The question whether a child is in 
some sense ―settled‖ in its new environment is so vague as to allow findings of 
habitual residence based on virtually any indication that the child has generally 
adjusted to life there.  
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 166. See Robert, 507 F.3d at 992. 
 167. See Robert, 507 F.3d at 991 (referring specifically to the reasoning used by the 
Seventh Circuit in Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 716 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 168. Koch v. Koch, 416 F. Supp. 2d 645, 651 (2006), aff’d on other grounds, 450 F.3d 703 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
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mother had only a conditional intent to remain in Greece drove that 
court to imbue seemingly inconsequential facts with great indicative 
meaning.
169
 In focusing on these facts, the court overlooked the 
obvious indications that the children had not acclimated to Greece.
170
 
In Holder, the court emphasized the specific amount of time that the 
family would spend in Germany while downplaying both the factual 
circumstances of the move. While the family ultimately spent only 
eight months in Germany, those were the first eight months of a four-
year military assignment.
171
 The family took all of its belongings with 
them and enrolled the older child in school.
172
 If anything, it appeared 
that the family did intend to change the children‘s habitual residence 
for those four years, but perhaps the children had not acclimated to 
their new surroundings during the short period in which they lived 
there. The Mozes framework, however, forces courts to decide based 
primarily on parental intent. Under these circumstances, that inquiry 
may be superfluous.
173
 
 
 169. The court, for instance, included the fact that there was not a going away party and 
that the older child had received ambiguous cards when he left school as indicative of the 
family‘s conditional intent. See Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 Additionally, the court found it important that the mother intended to continue ownership 
of a hotel in the United States. Id. This may be helpful, but does not warrant the court‘s 
emphasis. In our increasingly globalized world, business ownership in other nations does not 
require residence in that country. 
 170. These facts include that the family was only in Greece for four months, never had a 
permanent residence, the children had no Greek language ability and attended English speaking 
schools, the eldest child was unhappy, and the mother and children were prevented from 
leaving Greece after their father took their passports. Id. at 626–27. Meanwhile, the father 
brought his mistress along with him to Greece, and a quarrel between the parents resulted in a 
knife wound. Id. at 620. The children‘s lack of habitual residence could have been determined 
based on objective facts of acclimation alone, and therefore the court‘s analysis of the mother‘s 
conditional intent was superfluous. 
 171. See Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 172. The older child could easily consider himself habitually resident in Germany, 
especially considering that he likely believed he would be there for the entirety of his father‘s 
four-year assignment. Id. The older child was approximately five years old when the family 
moved to Germany. Id. Therefore, this period would be nearly the equivalent of his entire life 
thus far. Id. Four years is a long time for a five year old. See supra note 58.  
 173. Several other decisions are susceptible to a similar analysis. In Koch, the court 
ultimately held that the children had acclimated to their new environment and were therefore 
habitually resident in Germany. See Koch, 450 F.3d at 717–18. Therefore, the ―primary‖ 
inquiry into parental intent was likely unnecessary. In Gitter, the court spent the majority of its 
opinion discussing parental intent, but remanded based on the lack of evidence relating to 
acclimation. See Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 131–36 (2d Cir. 2005). Presumably, it could 
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The official commentary on the Convention makes it clear that the 
Convention desires to further the principle that a child is an 
individual with his own rights and needs, as opposed to simply being 
his parents‘ property.174 Focusing on the parents‘ desires, intentions, 
and subjective affections ―subordinates the child‘s experience.‖175 
Instead, courts should give effect to this aspect of the Convention by 
honoring the child‘s perception of where home is, at least so long as 
the child is old enough to form attachments independent of his 
caretaker.
176
 
Finally, the Mozes approach departs from the Convention 
interpretations adopted in other jurisdictions.
177
 Uniform Convention 
interpretation is essential if the Convention is to prevent parents from 
crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court.
178
 Moreover, 
the Convention binds all signatory countries to interpret the 
Convention uniformly.
179
 
B. The Friedrich Approach 
Friedrich‘s standard swings too far in the opposite direction from 
Mozes and fails to further the Convention‘s intentions by refusing to 
consider parental intent at all.
180
 The Convention, in part, seeks to 
prevent the unilateral alteration of a child‘s habitual residence.181 In 
 
have reached the same decision without engaging in ―primary‖ parental intent inquiry at all. See 
id.  
 In contrast to these examples, the Seventh Circuit recently engaged in what might be a 
more efficient analysis. The court first inquired into whether the child‘s acclimatization 
evidenced his habitual residence in the United States. Thompson v. Brown, No. 05 C 1648, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1187, *20–21 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007). The court then continued its 
analysis in order to examine the parents‘ intent, but did so only to reinforce their earlier 
determination. See id. at *25–26. 
 174. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 431–32. 
 175. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 992 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 176. See Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 296 (3d Cir. 2006); see also cases cited 
supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 177. Most countries adopt a more balanced approach and prefer to place a greater emphasis 
on the child‘s acclimation. See supra Part I.B and accompanying sources cited.  
 178. See supra note 13.  
 179. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. 
 180. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 181. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 569 F.3d 549, 560 (6th Cir. 2009); Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296; 
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 221 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
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order to determine whether one parent had acted unilaterally, it is 
helpful to consider what the parents once jointly intended.
182
 
Moreover, parents‘ past and present intentions regarding their child‘s 
habitual residence influence that child‘s views about his home.183 
Additionally, courts and commentators have noted that a habitual 
residence determination must consider parental intent when very 
young children are involved, as they are incapable of forming 
attachments independent of their primary caretaker.
184
 
C. The Feder and Karkkainen Approach 
The balancing approach typified by the Third Circuit in 
Karkkainen and Feder avoids some of the shortcomings inherent in 
the other analytic frameworks,
185
 but also highlights the difficulty 
inherent in implementing any formulaic approach to determining 
habitual residence. The balancing approach‘s strength lies in its 
commitment to inquire into acclimatization and settled purpose from 
the perspective of the child.
186
 As with other approaches, a court will 
attempt to determine whether a child turned a country into her home 
by the time of her removal.
187
 To do this, however, it places greater 
weight on findings relating to the child‘s contact with his 
surroundings, the child‘s meaningful relationships, and whether the 
child acquired a sense of normalcy.
188
 Additionally, the approach 
identifies specific factors indicative of the child‘s acclimatization and 
settled purpose.
189
 This focus on the child and specific objective 
indicators avoids many of the pitfalls of approaching habitual 
 
 182. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296. 
 183. Id. at 292. If a child thinks that his or her family lives someplace, or has moved 
somewhere in order to live there for the indeterminate future, then that child is more likely to 
consider that his home as well. See id. 
 184. The Third Circuit in particular has paid special attention to this issue. For further 
discussion, see supra note 117.  
 185. See discussion supra Parts II.A–B. 
 186. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292. 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 292; Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating the 
Convention seeks to prevent a child from being ―taken out of the family and social environment 
in which its life has developed‖); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004); Perez-
Vera Report, supra note 4, at 428–29. 
 188. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291–92. 
 189. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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residence with a primary focus on subjective parental intent, while 
more closely adhering to the Convention‘s intentions.190 Additionally, 
the balancing approach may more capably prevent unilateral removal 
than an approach focusing solely on the child, because it does take 
into account shared parental intent.
191
 Moreover, by paying attention 
to parental intent, the balancing approach allows courts to consider 
how the child‘s perception of parental intent may influence the 
child‘s acclimation.192  
However, the balancing approach shares some of the other 
approaches‘ problems. It is very difficult to judge when a child is 
truly capable of calling a place ―home.‖193 The balancing approach, 
which attempts to solve this dilemma by utilizing aspects of the other 
approaches, raises its own difficult questions. A court must determine 
when the child is old enough to have an independent sense of settled 
purpose instead of substituting the parents‘ settled purpose and intent, 
determine the manner in which parental intent influenced the child‘s 
subjective intent, and decide how much weight to give the identified 
objective factors.
194
 Furthermore, if the court set the bar for finding 
 
 190. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 191. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 192. See discussion supra Part II.B. and note 117. 
 193. The district court in Karkkainen utilized a series of experts in teaching and 
psychology, as well as the judge‘s impressions during the hearing. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 286. 
The court stated: 
The record reflects that Maria is both mature and intelligent for her age. An expert in 
teaching and training children in the performing arts testified that Maria is ―a very 
focused, gifted, talented and . . . creative child‖ with particularly strong skills in 
photography and drawing. An independent child psychologist found that Maria was 
―uniquely talented and highly intelligent,‖ an impression the District Court echoed 
after hearing Maria‘s testimony. Maria could communicate well in Finnish, English, 
and Russian, and had extensive experience traveling in Europe and the United States 
for visits with her father. She was, in short, much more experienced and mature than 
the average eleven year old when she came to the United States on June 6, 2003. 
Id. One assumes, however, that maturity with respect to other members of her age group is not 
necessarily indicative of an ability to acclimate independently of one‘s primary caregiver.  
 194. Any determination seemingly would depend on the individual facts. Otherwise, courts 
would face the difficult prospect of objectively allocating weight to factors such as school 
attendance, participation in athletics, or making friends. Inevitably, a court would consider 
some facts important and would discard others as inconsequential. For example, in Karkkainen 
the court discounted the fact that there was an unfiled custody agreement between the parents 
stipulating that Finland was the child‘s habitual residence, the child was only present in the 
United States for a single summer, and that the mother bought her daughter a round-trip ticket. 
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acclimation too low, then this would create an incentive for one 
parent unilaterally to remove the child ―in the hope that the child will 
quickly acclimatize and not be returned.‖195  
III. PROPOSAL 
Across jurisdictions, most of the various approaches acknowledge 
that habitual residence and ordinary residence are nearly conceptually 
equivalent.
196
 Moreover, an inquiry into a child‘s habitual residence 
is, to varying degrees, an inquiry into whether a child has made a 
country his or her ―home‖ before that child‘s removal.197 ―Home‖ is 
in some ways an elusive concept; it can be difficult to describe 
without idealizing or equating to past locations or memories, and it 
can be difficult to create purposefully in a place. Despite this quality, 
one knows when a place has become home. Perhaps on the simplest 
level, home is a circumstantial concept. It is where our family and 
loved ones are and where our passions are located, whether 
occupational, academic, or otherwise. As the saying goes, home is 
where the heart is.  
The Convention directs courts to locate a child‘s home, and in 
order to comport with the Convention‘s intentions, that inquiry must 
approach habitual residence in light of the child‘s perspective and 
circumstances.
198
 Thus, the question becomes, how do you determine 
where a child‘s home is located? The answer begins with the 
approach taken by the Third Circuit.
199
 Fact-based formulaic 
 
Id. at 285–90. Moreover, the court did not appear to consider that the mother did not have plans 
to come to the United States. See id. If she remained in the United States, there would likely be 
a negative impact on the relationship between the daughter and the parent who raised her.  
 195. Id. at 295–96. The court in Mozes also noted this danger. See supra note 165.  
 196. See, e.g., Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071–73 (9th Cir. 2001); Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 197. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291–93 (―[E]ach test has in common the goal of determining 
where a child‘s home is at the time of removal or retention.‖); cf. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1074–
80 (―[T]he Convention seeks to prevent harms thought to flow from wrenching or keeping a 
child from its familiar surroundings.‖); Friedrich, 893 F.2d at 1400 (discussing the importance 
of preserving the child‘s status quo). 
 198. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291–92; Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 
1995); Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 431–32. 
 199. Karkkainen is a recent example of this type of analysis. See discussion supra Part 
I.A.2.  
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approaches are often difficult to apply across the myriad of fact 
patterns present in Convention cases.
200
 However, some structure in 
the analysis assists in furthering the Convention‘s stated goal of 
uniformity.
201
 
The Third Circuit‘s flexible analytic structure grounds its analysis 
with the child and looks primarily to whether the child has acclimated 
to his or her surroundings and formed a settled intent to remain.
202
 
This comports more closely with the Convention‘s intent than an 
inquiry focused on parental intent.
203
 Next, courts should consider the 
parents‘ settled intent, which comprises a portion of the ―acclimation 
and settled purpose‖ inquiry because it offers valuable information 
about how the child perceives his or her circumstances.
204
 
Furthermore, consideration of shared parental intent helps to ensure 
that the Convention prevents the use of force and removal to create 
artificial jurisdiction in a sympathetic judicial forum.
205
  
The Third Circuit‘s approach emphasizes objective indications of 
acclimation and settled purpose, but courts should elaborate on the 
identified factors and expand those considered.
206
 Objective factors 
make an imprecise habitual residence determination more concrete. 
One important factor not explicitly recognized by courts is the 
accessibility of each parent to the child. An accessibility inquiry 
would include economic limitations, health complications, and 
immigration issues that affect the parent-child relationship. A 
determination of habitual residence can be a lengthy judicial process 
and is only among the first steps in a Convention dispute.
207
 The 
Convention recognizes that stability in the child‘s family and social 
environment is essential to the child‘s well-being.208 Oftentimes, the 
 
 200. See Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291. 
 201. See supra notes 13, 24, 25 and accompanying text. 
 202. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 203. See sources cited supra note 198; discussion supra Part II.A.  
 204. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 285, 294; see also discussion supra Part I.A.2, and note 117. 
 205. See supra note 13.  
 206. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., Feder v. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 227–31 (3d Cir. 1995) (Sarokin, 
J., dissenting) (noting the child spent more time in the United States waiting for the court‘s 
determination of his habitual residence than he originally spent in his habitual residence); see 
also discussion supra note 133. 
 208. Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291; Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 428, 431–32, 448; 
see discussion supra notes 11, 14.  
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presence of both parents helps to create this stability.
209
 Moreover, it 
is in the child‘s best interest to have both parents present in a child‘s 
life so long as there is no evidence of abuse or neglect.
210
 
Additionally, considering parental accessibility furthers the 
Convention‘s goal to prevent forum-shopping. The parent left behind 
may be unable able to travel internationally in order to take part in his 
or her child‘s life, and therefore a parental accessibility factor acts as 
a counterweight to a conclusion that the child should remain in his or 
her new location.
211
  
CONCLUSION 
The Convention seeks to protect children by preventing the 
unilateral removal of a child from his or her family and social 
environment. Habitual residence, as a foundational concept, must 
therefore focus primarily on where that child perceives his or her 
home to be. Courts must consider parents‘ shared intent, however, as 
this intent influences the child‘s perception of home and allows 
courts to identify unilateral action. Furthermore, any analysis must 
provide sufficient structure to facilitate uniform interpretation, but be 
flexible enough to adapt to the unique facts of each case. The Third 
Circuit‘s approach provides a sound foundational model. The 
addition of further objective factors that assist a court‘s inquiry would 
further refine this standard. 
International child abduction continues to challenge the world 
community. However, the Convention provides a strong framework 
through which member states can attempt to deter and alleviate the 
upheaval, family strain, and childhood trauma that accompany a 
child‘s unilateral removal from his or her home. Because children are 
necessarily at the heart of each Convention case, courts must 
continue to place the child at the center of every Convention analysis. 
 
 209. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 4, at 431–32. 
 210. See supra note 123. 
 211. For example, a court might avoid a situation analogous to Mikovic. See discussion 
supra Parts I.A.1., II.A.  
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